

On the allocation of reductions, the amendment reads, "The Secretary of Defense shall allocate reductions in authorizations of appropriations that are necessary as the result of the application of the limitation set forth in subsection (a) so as to not jeopardize the military readiness of the Armed Forces or the quality of life of Armed Forces personnel," my assumption being that clearly the Pentagon and Defense Department in their budget request have already taken this into account.

I wanted to be clear about the wording of this.

Mr. NUNN. I understand. I know what the Senator was doing. I will respond briefly.

There is the problem, though, that the reduction here will have to come out of modernization. This is a procurement account, which is already where the problem is.

Mr. WELLSTONE. Finally, Mr. President, in response to that, I was pointing out before the Senator came to the floor, we voted 100 to 0 for what I think is an important study of force structure and modernization yesterday, but my concern is that what we have here is an acceleration of weapons programs that may not be necessary, may be obsolete, and we ought to go forward with that study.

I finish up quoting from Senator MCCAIN's view on the Armed Services Committee. His comments:

Again, I believe this is overall a very good defense bill, and I voted in favor of reporting the bill to the Senate. However, I feel that the additional \$13 billion included in this bill may not survive the congressional budget review process this year. In the event that this bill must be reduced by \$3 billion or \$4 billion or more, I hope my colleagues will look carefully at these pork-barrel add-ons. We must protect the high-priority military programs which contribute to the future readiness of our Armed Forces. If this bill must be reduced, we should cut out the pork first.

That is what this amendment is about. I really believe in cutting out this pork and doing the deficit reduction, going after the \$13 billion above and beyond what the Pentagon requested, the President requested, the military leadership requested.

I yield back the rest of my time.

UNANIMOUS-CONSENT REQUEST— H.R. 3525

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the majority leader, after consultation with the Democratic leader, may proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 453, H.R. 3525, relating to damage to religious property, and that time on the bill be limited to the following: Senator LOTT, 10 minutes; Senator DASCHLE, 10 minutes; Senator FAIRCLOTH, 10 minutes; Senator KENNEDY, 10 minutes. Further, that the bill be limited to one amendment to be offered by Senators FAIRCLOTH, KENNEDY and HATCH. Further, no other amendments be in order, and that immediately following the disposition of that amendment and the

expiration or yielding back of the time, the bill be read a third time and the Senate then immediately proceed to a vote on passage of H.R. 3525 as amended, if amended.

Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I rise to raise an objection. I was sorry I was not able to hear fully what the unanimous consent agreement was by the Senator from South Carolina. As the Senator from South Carolina and the Senator from Georgia know, I have been trying to work through several things that are pending to move this bill along. I think it is important that we finish the defense authorization bill. I say that as a member of the committee.

Would the Senator from South Carolina please restate, basically, to this Senator what his unanimous consent request was. I may not object, but I was not able to ascertain what the thrust of the unanimous consent request was.

Mr. THURMOND. I have another unanimous consent, if that might please the Senator.

I also ask unanimous consent upon the expiration or yielding back of time on the WELLSTONE amendment, that amendment be temporarily set aside to consider a Thurmond-Nunn amendment regarding the authorized funding levels in the bill, with no second-degree amendments in order, so that the amendment following the debate on the Thurmond-Nunn amendment, S. 1745, be temporarily set aside and the Senate return to consideration of the church burning bill under the provisions of the unanimous consent agreement.

Mr. EXON. I object.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. THOMAS). The objection is heard.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.

AMENDMENT NO. 4266

Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the WELLSTONE amendment be temporarily set aside for the purpose of this Senator offering an amendment.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I object.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The objection is heard.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska still has the floor.

Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I had asked for unanimous consent to tempo-

rarily set aside the WELLSTONE amendment for the purpose of the Senator from Nebraska offering an amendment. That has been objected to by the chairman of the subcommittee, which blocks my attempt to offer the amendment. Therefore, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, may I inquire how much time is left on the Wellstone amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina has 5 minutes remaining.

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I wonder if the Senator from South Carolina will yield me the 5 minutes.

Mr. THURMOND. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Indiana.

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, while we are debating and straightening out a procedural quandary we are in with a number of amendments, let me use up the remaining time on the Wellstone amendment and speak in opposition to it.

The assumption behind the amendment is that defense is overfunded. We talk about the adding of additional billions of dollars to the defense bill as if the adding was over and above what the defense ought to be and, therefore, is surplus pork barrel, extraneous money.

I think it is important to understand that, first of all, defense has been declining, as has been stated, for 12 straight years. Funding, overall, for defense is down 41 percent in real terms since 1985, at 1950 levels of funding; modernization is at 1975 levels of funding, and the budget resolution funds defense at \$7.4 billion below last year's defense level in real terms.

Maybe this chart can better illustrate what I am trying to say. In fiscal year 1996, the Appropriations Committee appropriated \$264.4 billion in spending for defense for fiscal year 1996. That represented the 12th straight year of decline in defense spending in real terms.

Now, the Clinton administration came in and said, even though that is a reduction from previous years, we want to reduce it even further. They brought the level down to \$254.4, an additional \$10 billion cut.

Then we in the Senate brought forward legislation which would fund defense at last year's spending level—adjust it, in other words, to buy the same amount of defense this year that we bought last year. Without increasing it, but just buying the same level, it would have been, because of inflation, \$273 billion.

What we have proposed in this legislation is a \$267.3 billion total, which is,

of course, above the President's request. But the President's request was way below just keeping level with defense.

Now, this total increase here is \$18.6 billion over the President's request, just to buy last year's defense. We did not think we could go that far and meet our obligations to help balance the budget, so we took two-thirds of that and went to \$267.3 billion. So the assumption that we are somehow throwing an additional \$10 billion into defense is simply wrong.

The defense outlays have been reduced 11 percent just since 1993, while nondefense outlays for the same period have increased 23 percent. It is not defense that is overfunded; it is defense that is underfunded. We are just trying to keep part of what we had, without falling further and further behind.

The second point that we hear over and over is that the Defense Department did not request this money, therefore implying it is all congressional add-ons. I have two responses to that.

No. 1, since when does the Congress simply buy off on the requests from the various departments of the administration without challenging or looking at the requests or going a little further than what their stated public request is? That is our job. We are elected to make the final decision in terms of how much we spend for education, how much we spend for the arts, how much we spend for transportation, how much we spend for defense, and every other item in the budget. That is why we have a Budget Committee, that is why we have Appropriations Committees, that is why we have authorization committees, to determine how much we ought to spend. That is what we are doing here.

Second, and probably more important, the Department of Defense—I have 17 pages of quotes here from representatives from the Department of Defense saying we need to spend more. Obviously, what happened here is that the Department of Defense has been told by this administration that "you will not spend more than \$254 billion. Now you salute and make it work and sound like that is all you need." So it is false to say that the Department of Defense did not even request the money.

I can go down through the 17 pages of the list, from the Secretary of Defense to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the chiefs of the various services, and quote from every one of them, saying: We are dangerously below where we ought to be. Modernization is dangerously underfunded. We ought to be funding it at a \$60 billion level. Instead, we are funding it at nearly half of that, roughly \$38 billion.

I do not have time to give all these quotes, Mr. President, so I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD excerpts of the quotes from members of the Department of Defense as to why this budget of \$254.4 is too

low and why we are dangerously underfunding defense needs for the future.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

EXCERPTS OF TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, U.S. SENATE, ON THE DEFENSE BUDGET REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997

MODERNIZATION—CRITICAL NEED

... what I am projecting for you is that we have to start increasing the modernization program or this curve will just keep going straight up, and we will start to have a real problem in obsolescence of equipment in the field.—Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, March 5, 1996.

... the modernization account in FY 1997 will be the lowest it has been in many years, about one third of what it was in FY 1985.—Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, March 5, 1996.

I am very concerned that our procurement accounts are not where I think they ought to be. ... [We] must commit ourselves to a sufficient procurement goal, a goal I judge to be approximately \$60 billion annually.—Chairman of the JCS, GEN Shalikashvili, March 5, 1996. [The procurement budget request for FY 1997 was \$38.9 billion.]

We've got to stop promising ourselves and start doing something about this procurement issue which, I think, is the basis of our ability to recapitalize America's military, not just the ships and tanks and airplanes, but also ... remarkable technologies.—Vice Chairman, JCS, ADM William Owens, February 28, 1996.

Unless we recapitalize, we are not going to be ready to meet the threats of the future.—Chief of Staff, Air Force, GEN Ronald Fogelman, March 14, 1996.

If we do not modernize, we ultimately place future readiness at risk.—Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Michael Boorda, March 14, 1996.

Further deferral of modernization will incur significant risk to future readiness.—Chief of Staff, Army, GEN Dennis Reimer, March 13, 1996.

I want to talk ... about procurement because I believe it is the crisis in the defense budget today.—Vice Chairman, JCS, ADM William Owens, February 28, 1996.

In the long term, our most urgent need is to modernize our fighter force. By the time the F-22 reaches IOC in 2005, the F-15 will be in its fourth decade of active service as our front-line fighter.—Secretary of the Air Force, Hon. Sheila Widnall, March 14, 1996.

Procurement has continued to pay the bill for readiness and force structure over the past decade and now hovers at a post-World War II low of about \$40 billion.—Chairman of the JCS, GEN Shalikashvili, March 5, 1996.

General Shalikashvili estimates the services would need about \$60 billion of annual procurement funding. The Department of the Navy would need about \$28.5 million annually to sustain its Bottom-Up Review force structure.—Secretary of the Navy, Hon. John Dalton, March 12, 1996.

We preserved our readiness and force structure at the expense of modernization and equipment replacement. We still need to keep readiness a top priority. But we have been able to enjoy a procurement hiatus, so much so that our procurement account has actually shrunk to just below \$40 billion, the lowest since the Korean War ... This procurement hiatus ... cannot be sustained indefinitely.—Chairman of the JCS, GEN Shalikashvili, March 5, 1996.

Investment accounts ... have been at relatively low levels for several years, and I have reported on that each of the 3 years

that I have come before you.—Secretary of the Army, Hon. Togo West, March 13, 1996.

For the Marine Corps, since 1971 we have averaged about \$1.2 billion annually for procurement. This year we are at about \$556 million. You can see the concerns that we have.—Commandant, Marine Corps, Gen. Charles Krulak, March 12, 1996.

Equipment ... permits us to remain dominant on the battlefield ... In order to maintain this edge, we must continue to modernize.—Secretary of the Army, Hon. Togo West, March 13, 1996.

Like the F-15, the F-16 will be entering its fourth decade as the most numerous fighter in our inventory by the time its replacement begins to arrive.—Secretary of the Air Force, Hon. Sheila Widnall, March 14, 1996.

Procurement accounts have been at relatively low levels for several years ... the Army will have to once again fund modernization more robustly.—Secretary of the Army, Hon. Togo West, March 13, 1996.

We must modernize to protect our soldiers ... [This makes them] more survivable ... [and gives] them the edge.—Chief of Staff, Army, GEN Dennis Reimer, March 13, 1996.

The greatest potential threat to Army readiness is the medium and long term impact: of an increased operational pace and insufficient modernization funding ... by failing to modernize and update our equipment, we put tomorrow's soldiers at risk.—Chief of Staff, Army, GEN Dennis Reimer, March 13, 1996.

In the event of a conflict, a lack of modern equipment will cost the lives of brave soldiers.—Chief of Staff, Army, GEN Dennis Reimer, March 13, 1996.

Further forestalling of modernization would greatly increase risk. There are long lead times for modern equipment and longer lead times to develop and train the leaders who will employ it. Consequently, further deferral of modernization could delay a modernized force beyond the limits of our ability to anticipate future security challenges. Creating such a window of vulnerability could lead to a future environment where the interests of the United States are directly threatened.—Chief of Staff, Army, GEN Dennis Reimer, March 13, 1996.

30 years ago, our predecessors ... structured the fighter force that has served this Nation so well in the decades since. It is now up to us to show that same foresight as we look towards the uncertain world of tomorrow. We owe that to this Nation and to the young people ... who will face the risks of combat.—Secretary of the Air Force, Hon. Sheila Widnall, March 14, 1996.

We need to think about future priorities in terms of the range of capabilities useful for the world that is coming ... we need forces which are broadly useful, not just capable on a single set of narrowly defined battlefields.—Commandant, Marine Corps, Gen. Charles Krulak, March 14, 1996.

We end up deferring programs and finding work-arounds. We end up increasing the bill in the outyears. It is very difficult for me to specifically point out a big problem in that it is a lot of little slices that impact us because it impacts the stability of our modernization programs.—Chief of Staff, Air Force, GEN Ronald Fogelman, March 14, 1996.

I ask your help to ensure that your Nation's Air Force has the proper equipment and the best quality people to meet the needs of the 21st Century.—Chief of Staff, Air Force, GEN Ronald Fogelman, March 14, 1996.

The issue still is that we are underfunded in modernization.—Chief of Staff, Army, GEN Dennis Reimer, March 13, 1996.

We know that we cannot procure everything in the near-term, so we ... built a time-phased modernization plan ... [that] is

very delicate. And we cannot afford to see procurement dollars slide out to the right.—Chief of Staff, Air Force, Gen Ronald Fogelman, March 14, 1996.

We have benefitted from the aircraft procurement of the 1980's. That is what has really sustained us.—Chief of Staff, Air Force, Gen Ronald Fogelman, March 14, 1996.

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

I am sure you realize as well as we do that severely constrained modernization resources have extended fielding times, have delayed modernization of the total force, have delayed deploying a next generation of systems and from a business standpoint have resulted in some inefficient programs.—Assistant Secretary of the Army for RD&A Gilbert Decker, March 28, 1996.

Somewhere along the line when you [slow procurement] you get risk . . . then comes the risk in casualties because you don't close with the right type of force, with the right application, and so the prosecution of your battle just takes longer.—Commander in Chief, United States Central Command, Gen Binford Peay, March 28, 1996.

Our men and women don't ask you for very much and they don't ask us for very much. They want and require ships and weapon systems that are effective, and they need that not only today but they need it in the future. We talk about quality of life—that is the ultimate quality of life if you go in harm's way.—Commandant, Marine Corps, Gen Charles Krulak, March 13, 1996.

I [have watched] the Air Force procurement accounts decrease by some 60 percent . . . we are living off the procurement of the past. It has to stop.—Chief of Staff, Air Force, Gen Ronald Fogelman, March 13, 1996.

READINESS

[The Marine Corps is] the Nation's force in readiness, and charged [by Congress to be] most ready when the Nation is least ready . . . they must be ready to go at a moment's notice, and when they go they must be ready to win. Commandant, Marine Corps, Gen Charles Krulak, March 14, 1996.

[the issue] that we face today in the Air Force is primarily a long-range readiness issue. We are confronted with the requirement to invest in tomorrow's readiness to begin to recapitalize the force to modernize our Armed Forces.—Chief of Staff, Air Force, Gen Ronald Fogelman, March 14, 1996.

In our business, we need to be ready not only twenty minutes from now, but twenty years from now as well . . . If we do not modernize, we ultimately place future readiness at risk.—Chief of Naval Operations, Adm Michael Boorda, March 14, 1996.

The Army has maintained current readiness . . . by deferring modernization . . . Further deferral of modernization will incur significant risk to future readiness.—Chief of Staff, Army, Gen Dennis Reimer, March 13, 1996.

Throughout the downsizing, our priority has been on maintaining current readiness.—Chief of Naval Operations, Adm Michael Boorda, March 14, 1996.

If we work our people too hard, and by "too hard" I mean being away from home, they will not stay with us . . . If we work our equipment beyond its reasonable limits or do not maintain it well because it is deployed, then our people have to work harder to try to keep it up and they will not stay with us. Those are lessons we learned the hard way not too many years ago . . . We cannot afford to get in [that position again].—Chief of Naval Operations, Adm Michael Boorda, March 14, 1996.

I will admit to you that we have probably mortgaged the modernization account in order to take care of our people . . .—Chief

of Staff, Army, Gen Dennis Reimer, March 13, 1996.

Regardless of how we rationalize . . . if [the force] gets too small it will not be ready because we will not see the requirements go away, we will just [do] them on the backs of our people . . . We have been down that road before . . . It is not pretty.—Chief of Naval Operations, Adm Michael Boorda, March 14, 1996.

The Army is nearing the end of an historic drawdown . . . About 450,000 volunteer soldiers and civilians have left the Army . . . [that is] about as many people as are employed by Ford and Chrysler Motor Companies combined . . . Many did not want to leave . . . It was important to us to ensure that we took care of [these] people and to keep the remaining Army trained and ready . . . In order to do this, the accounts for modernization were reduced . . . there was a cost . . . We paid a price that may not be seen for some time. We have yet to see the drawdown's effects on leadership and retention. In cavalry terms, our units have been ridden hard and put away wet.—Chief of Staff, Army Gen Dennis Reimer, March 13, 1996.

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

We have received help from the Hill. It has been greatly appreciated . . . But we are not where we ought to be . . . I went with my godchild to his barracks . . . and I was appalled at what he was living in. 'Appalled' is probably a mild word for it . . . We are building some barracks, we are building some homes . . . but it is not to the level that I, as Commandant, or you, as a public servant, would be very pleased about. It is simply a matter of available money.—Commandant, Marine Corps, Gen Charles Krulak, March 13, 1996.

ON ADDING FUNDS ABOVE THE BUDGET REQUEST

. . . we have to start increasing the modernization program or this curve will just keep going straight up, and we will start to have a real problem in obsolescence of equipment in the field.—Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, March 5, 1996.

The issue really revolves around the fact that we do not have enough in the modernization account.—Chief of Staff, Army, Gen. Dennis Reimer, March 13, 1996.

I should point out that we do have a bow wave in the out-years that, should the Congress choose to invest additional funding, we think that reducing that bow wave would be advantageous.—Secretary of the Navy, Hon. John Dalton, March 12, 1996.

Yes [We could use additional funds if Congress provided them in fiscal year 1997]. We still have some holes in our modernization account.—Chief of Staff, Army, Gen. Dennis Reimer, March 13, 1996.

Last year we had an authorization for three DDG-51s but not enough funds. An average of three DDGs across every year is the fewest we should buy, not the maximum. A long term strategy should call for more than that.—Chief of Naval Operations, Adm Michael Boorda, March 12, 1996.

[In response to the question of whether there is a need for additional funding] We would be willing—we would be delighted, actually, to work with you to give specific programmatic examples. . . we would apply such money to . . . acceleration of existing programs. . . upgrades of platforms. . . [and] recapitalization.—Secretary of the Air Force, Hon. Sheila Widnall, March 14, 1996.

If additional funds became available, we could indeed convert two ships for [Maritime Prepositioning Force purposes]. If Congress added funds, an additional ship could be converted this coming year. . . I agree with the Commandant concerning advisability of

those ships.—Secretary of the Navy, Hon. John Dalton, March 12, 1996.

We are short, still, in the Army some 40,000 trucks.—Chief of staff, Army, Gen. Dennis Reimer, March 13, 1996.

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

I applaud the efforts of this Congress in most of the items that were added to the 1996 bill because you did what I requested during the discussions here with this committee, which is that most of that add-on was not pork.—Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, March 6, 1996.

You helped me on [procurement] last year, and I really appreciate it. And I will tell you it made a big difference for about 44,000 Marines.—Commandant, Marine Corps, Gen. Charles Krulak, March 13, 1996.

I would like to thank you for your support last year, both in your quality of life initiatives, particularly in the MILCON [military construction] area. Folks sometimes would like to describe these plus-ups in quality of life as unnecessary, but the fact of the matter is, the plus-ups that we saw in MILCON last year were accelerations of things that our people would have had to wait for, so we did not see that as wasteful.—Chief of Staff, Air Force, Gen. Ronald Fogelman, March 13, 1996.

I want to take this opportunity to thank this committee, particularly the Military Construction Subcommittee, for the very good support you have given us in improving the quality of our housing * * * I am not satisfied with the effort on housing, as you are not satisfied with it * * * It would be a lot easier if I simply has more money.—Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, March 6, 1996.

We saw that the plus-ups in the procurement accounts were * * * the kinds of things that help us with the procurement that we see out there in the future.—Chief of Staff, Air Force, Gen. Ronald Fogelman, March 14, 1996.

DEFENSE—GENERAL

Few people know, few people understand, few people have spent the time to look across the spectrum of American warfighting capabilities and technologies.—Vice Chairman, JCS, Adm William Owens, February 28, 1996.

Past experience shows us that when you try to precisely project yourself into the future, you are probably going to be precisely wrong.—Chief of Staff, Air Force, Gen Ronald Fogelman, March 14, 1996.

The chaotic and uncertain strategic environment looming just over the horizon creates an even more pressing imperative for a military force that can remain versatile yet act decisively . . . a force that can quickly and surely anticipate change and adapt to a new reality.—Commandant, Marine Corps, Gen Charles Krulak, March 14, 1996.

Our heavy units are general purpose forces that not only can win our wars but can also accomplish other missions, as the First Armed Division has shown in Bosnia. We must modernize their equipment to deter mid and high intensity conflict.—Chief of Staff, Army, Gen Dennis Reimer, March 13, 1996.

. . . at the end of the day, you are still going to have to have the beans and bullets and lift . . . technology is just simply not a panacea.—Commander in Chief, United States Central Command, Gen Binford Peay, March 19, 1996.

. . . at the end of the day, you need combat capability in the field.—Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Command and Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, Gen John Sheehan, March 19, 1996.

The challenge that we face is that [in] the Army [we put about 45% of the budget into

military pay] . . . another 30% . . . goes towards training . . . so you are left with very little in terms of procurement.—Chief of Staff, Army, Gen Dennis Reimer, March 13, 1996.

Mr. COATS. Second, Mr. President, let me state that there are a number of programs in the past that the Department of Defense has not requested, which this Congress has determined are important to be added to the Department of Defense budget. And we have done so. Looking back, in hindsight it is a good thing that we did. Strategic sealift: Now the Department of Defense comes and says it is one of their top priorities. They did not require it, nor request it before, maybe because the administration said do not do it. They are darned glad that we did not abide by their request. Some of the C-17's, the V-22, countermine efforts—we find that we were seriously underfunded and underprepared in the past in terms of dealing with countermine activity. This Congress made a decision to go forward and fund some of that. We are darned glad they did, and the Defense Department is darned glad that they did.

So let us be realistic on this. I urge my colleagues to vote against the Wellstone amendment for the reasons stated. It is simply a misstatement of what the request is from the Department of Defense. It is more a statement of what the administration would like out of defense, which is to cut it, to cut it, and cut it so that they can take the money and fund their favorite programs and not provide for adequate security for this country.

Mr. President, how much time is left?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. COATS. I regret that because I am just getting warmed up. I will cease and desist.

Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. President, I note the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I notice that the negotiations are still going on. I am prepared to stop talking as soon as they are prepared to go forward. In the meantime, rather than dead air, I thought I would say one more thing about the Wellstone amendment.

I have had the opportunity in the last few years as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and chairman of the Personnel Subcommittee to examine our military housing that we provide for soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, both married personnel and their families, as well as single personnel.

It is a shocking statistic to note that more than 60 percent of current mili-

tary housing, family and single housing, is substandard by military standards. Military standards are generally lower than civilian standards. The houses that you and I live in, the apartments that the single individuals live in, are built to a far higher quality and standard than what the military enjoys.

It is part of the nature of the military that they salute and serve and do not complain. But it is virtually a disgrace to note the condition of some of this housing: Deteriorating ceilings, leaking pipes, asbestos-lined pipes in the ceilings, falling plaster, crumbling stairways, inadequate space for families and for children.

I commend the Secretary of Defense and the Department of Defense for recognizing this problem and taking some initiative to deal with it. But we are a long way from solving this problem. In fact, if we stayed at the current pace of renovation, it would take 30 years to bring military housing up to the standard level. Of course, by that time all housing that is standard today would be substandard.

So it is a never-ending cycle. We need to accelerate that process, and we hope we will accelerate that process. But to suggest that defense is overfunded when we are asking our service families to live in substandard housing and when we are asking our service members to live in substandard barracks and are asking them to live in the conditions that they live I think it is misunderstanding the situation as it currently exists in the United States military.

Just recently I was touring some barracks and housing facilities in Georgia. I was informed by the commander of a number of units that the soldiers were on their off time on Saturdays and Sundays and weekends going out to Home Depot to purchase materials and voluntarily giving up of their time to repair some of their facilities just so that they can take showers and live in some kind of decent housing situation.

So I think it is important to recognize that this continual 12-year decline in real terms in defense spending is not only affecting our ability to fight future wars, to have the technology, research and modernization necessary but it is eroding the quality of life of our service personnel which is going to affect our ability to attract the kind of people we want to serve in the military.

I hope my colleagues will take that into consideration in considering the vote on the Wellstone amendment.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the church burning provision of the previous unanimous-consent request made by the Senator from South Carolina alone be renewed. So I am asking unanimous consent that that portion of the overall

request propounded by the Senator from South Carolina which was objected to, the church burning part of that, alone be renewed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

CHURCH ARSON PREVENTION ACT OF 1996

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (H.R. 3525) to amend title 18, United States Code, to clarify the Federal jurisdiction over offenses relating to damage to religious property.

The Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

AMENDMENT NO. 4341

(Purpose: To propose a substitute)

Mr. FAIRCLOTH. Mr. President, under the unanimous-consent agreement, I send an amendment to the desk on behalf of myself and Senators KENNEDY, HATCH, BIDEN, KOHL, SARBANES, and NUNN, and I ask for its consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from North Carolina [Mr. FAIRCLOTH], for himself, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. HATCH, Mr. BIDEN, Mr. KOHL, Mr. SARBANES, and Mr. NUNN proposes an amendment numbered 4341.

The amendment is as follows:

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Church Arson Prevention Act of 1996".

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

The Congress finds the following:

(1) The incidence of arson or other destruction or vandalism of places of religious worship, and the incidence of violent interference with an individual's lawful exercise or attempted exercise of the right of religious freedom at a place of religious worship pose a serious national problem.

(2) The incidence of arson of places of religious worship has recently increased, especially in the context of places of religious worship that serve predominantly African-American congregations.

(3) Changes in Federal law are necessary to deal properly with this problem.

(4) Although local jurisdictions have attempted to respond to the challenges posed by such acts of destruction or damage to religious property, the problem is sufficiently serious, widespread, and interstate in scope to warrant Federal intervention to assist State and local jurisdictions.

(5) Congress has authority, pursuant to the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, to make acts of destruction or damage to religious property a violation of Federal law.

(6) Congress has authority, pursuant to section 2 of the 13th amendment to the Constitution, to make actions of private citizens motivated by race, color, or ethnicity that interfere with the ability of citizens to hold or use religious property without fear of attack, violations of Federal criminal law.

SEC. 3. PROHIBITION OF VIOLENT INTERFERENCE WITH RELIGIOUS WORSHIP.

Section 247 of title 18, United States Code, is amended—